Did China actually commit to 15 GW of CSP in 5 years?

Kevin Tu on CSP in China energy planning in the 15th Five-Year Plan

China has really been building out CSP at a rapid pace in the last few years, overtaking what the US ever built commercially through 2015 (1.5 GW), and now China is second only to what Spain built in the last decade, 2.3 GW. As of mid 2026, China has a relatively new 2.1 GW in operation, and multiple projects out to bid or under construction.

But in December, the China Solar Thermal Alliance (CSTA) published the NEA ‘opinions’ that the nation should have 15 GW by 2030.

Even for China, to go from 2.1 GW to 15 GW in 5 years would be quite a feat! I wanted to know from a China policy expert, what part does NEA play, and is that an actual requirement?

For example, in the past, China’s government had required that CSP plants must include thermal energy storage, and no Chinese CSP has been allowed without storage, a mistake the US made, in Ivanpah.

To get some context, I contacted Kevin Tu, Chief Advisor China at Agora Energiewende, previously Managing Director at Agora Energy China. Tu has also led the China energy and climate programmes at the International Energy Agency (IEA).

He untangled some of the subtleties of the communication in an email, explaining the translations and including what part the NEA plays.

Kevin Tu:

“The National Energy Administration (NEA) is a sub-ministerial agency directly under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which itself sits under the State Council.

The NEA drafts and administers sectoral energy plans (like this one), but the FYP itself is issued with reference to, and in implementation of, the overarching National Economic and Social Development 15th Five-Year Plan Outline — a document approved by the National People’s Congress.

So this energy-sector plan is a specialized/subordinate plan (专项规划) that operationalizes the top-level national plan; NEA is the implementing/drafting body, not an independent legislative authority.

On bindingness: the plan itself explicitly distinguishes between two categories of targets in 专栏1 (Column/Box 1):

约束性 (binding/mandatory) indicators: these are treated as firm requirements the government is committed to delivering (e.g., total energy production capacity of 5.8 billion tce, non-fossil consumption share of 25%, unit power generation carbon emissions reduction >10%).

预期性 (anticipated/indicative) indicators: these are goals or expectations, not hard commitments (e.g., total power capacity of 5.4 billion kW, non-fossil power generation share of 50%, wind+solar >50% of capacity).

For example, the plan sets wind + solar installed capacity to exceed 50% of total power capacity and become the “mainstay” of the power mix, but this specific figure is listed as 预期性 (anticipated), not binding.

For CSP, the number that appears in the official document is 15 million kW (1500万千瓦) , i.e., 15 GW, as a cumulative installed capacity target for CSP by 2030.

This appears in 专栏3 (Box/Column 3), item 4 on “光热发电” (concentrated solar/thermal power), which states: “到2030年，光热发电累计装机力争达到1500万千瓦” : “By 2030, strive to reach a cumulative installed CSP capacity of 15 million kW (15 GW).”

This figure is presented with the phrasing “力争达到” (strive to reach) , language that is aspirational/best-effort, similar in register to 预期性 targets, even though this particular item appears in a “key projects” box (专栏) rather than the main indicator table (专栏1), so it doesn’t carry a formal 约束性/预期性 designation at all. It’s a project-level ambition attached to a specific “key infrastructure project” (重点工程) list, not a top-level five-year indicator.

In Section (一), under “持续扩大非化石能源供给规模” (continuously expanding non-fossil energy supply), where the plan states China will “推进…光热发电、海洋能规模化发展” : promote large-scale development of CSP and ocean energy, alongside offshore wind moving into deeper waters.
In 专栏3, item 4, with the specific 15 GW/2030 figure discussed above.

For context, the 15th FYP (2026–2030) sets a binding (约束性) target of 25% non-fossil energy share of total energy consumption by 2030, up from 21.7% in 2025 (the end-point of the 14th FYP period), as shown explicitly in the plan’s indicator table (专栏1). So the increase is roughly 3.3 percentage points over the five-year period, continuing the same trajectory as the 14th FYP, which had targeted around 20% by 2025 (later reported at 21.7%, i.e., slightly ahead of schedule).

CSP is a real, named component of the plan, but it’s treated as a smaller-scale, supplementary technology relative to wind, solar PV, hydro, and nuclear, which get their own dedicated sub-sections, 2030 capacity figures in the main text, and infrastructure/project planning.

CSP’s treatment, one project-box mention plus a general “promote at scale” reference, signals it remains a niche/demonstration-stage technology in China’s 2030 planning, not a pillar technology on par with wind/solar/hydro/nuclear.

However, this is the same for many emerging technologies. You need time and concerted efforts by all key stakeholders in order to quickly ramp up capacity and achieve economies of scale.

Translating indicative technology targets into actual deployment will require stable implementation mechanisms, including provincial targets, market incentives and coordinated investment in transmission and storage.

By international standards, China has made considerable progress in this technology. But meanwhile, if you look at CSP in national power generation, capacity is still relatively minimal, because China has the largest power market in the world and in order to make a meaningful impact you need a rather huge capacity.”

The post Did China actually commit to 15 GW of CSP in 5 years? appeared first on SolarPACES.